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Abstract
We provide the first fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing
an approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in tree-structured graphical multi-hypermatrix
games (GMhGs). GMhGs are generalizations of normal-form games, graphical games, graphical
polymatrix games, and hypergraphical games. Computing an exact mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
in graphical polymatrix games is PPAD-complete and thus generally believed to be intractable. In
contrast, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to establish an FPTAS for tree polymatrix
games as well as tree graphical games when the number of actions is bounded by a constant. As a
corollary, we give a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (quasi-PTAS) when the number
of actions is bounded by the logarithm of the number of players.
1. Introduction
For over a decade, graphical games have been at the forefront of computational game theory. In a
graphical game, a player’s payoff is directly affected by her own action and those of her neighbors.
This large class of games has played a critical role in establishing the hardness of computing a
Nash equilibrium in general games (Daskalakis, Goldberg, & Papadimitriou, 2009a). It has also
generated a great deal of interest in the AI community since Kearns, Littman, and Singh (2001)
drew a parallel with probabilistic graphical models in terms of succinct representation by exploiting
the network structure. As a result, this is one of the select topics in computer science that has
triggered a confluence of ideas from the theoretical computer science and AI communities.
This paper contributes to this development by providing the first fully polynomial-time approx-
imation scheme (FPTAS) for approximate Nash equilibrium computation in a generalized class of
tree graphical games. Tree-structured interactions are natural in hierarchical settings. As often visu-
alized in the ubiquitous organizational chart of bureaucratic structures (Weber, 1948), hierarchical
organizations are arguably the most common managerial structures still found around the world,
particularly in large corporations and governmental institutions (e.g., military), as well as in many
social and religious institutions. Supply chains are also commonplace, such as in agriculture (see,
e.g., Dani & Deep, 2010). Even within the context of energy grids, the traditional electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution systems are tree-structured, and are commonly modeled
mathematically and computationally as such (see Dvijotham, Chertkov, Van Hentenryck, Vuffray,
& Misra, 2016, for a recent example).
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CSP Constraint Satisfaction Problem
DP Dynamic Programming
FPTAS Fully Polynomial Time Approx. Scheme
GMhG Graphical Multi-hypermatrix Game
MSNE Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Quasi-PTAS Quasi-Polynomial Time Approx. Scheme
Table 1: Acronyms used in this paper.
Our algorithm eliminates the exponential dependency on the maximum degree of a node, a
problem that has plagued research for 15 years since the inception of graphical games (Kearns
et al., 2001).
More generally, we consider the problem of computing approximate MSNE in GMhGs, as de-
fined by Ortiz (2014). We refer the reader to Table 1 for a list of acronyms used throughout this
paper. Roughly speaking, in a GMhG, each player’s payoff is the summation of several local payoff
hypermatrices defined with respect to each individual player’s local hypergraph. GMhGs general-
ize normal-form games, graphical games (Kearns et al., 2001; Kearns, 2007), graphical polymatrix
games, and hypergraphical games (Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008). For approximate MSNE,
we adopt the standard notion of -MSNE (also known as -approximate MSNE), an additive (as op-
posed to relative) approximation scheme widely used in algorithmic game theory (Lipton, Markakis,
& Mehta, 2003; Daskalakis, Mehta, & Papadimitriou, 2007; Deligkas, Fearnley, Savani, & Spirakis,
2014; Barman, Ligett, & Piliouras, 2015).
In this paper, we provide FPTAS and quasi-PTAS for GMhGs in which the individual player’s
number of actions m and the hypertree-width w of the underlying game hypergraph are bounded.
The key to our solution is the formulation of a CSP such that any solution to this CSP is an -MSNE
of the game. This raises two challenging questions: Will the CSP have any solution at all? In case
it has a solution, how can we compute it efficiently? Regarding the first question, we discretize both
the probability space and the payoff space of the game to guarantee that for any MSNE of the game
(which always exists), the nearest grid point is a solution to the CSP. For the second question, we
give a DP algorithm that is an FPTAS when m and w are bounded by a constant. Most remarkably,
this algorithm eliminates the exponential dependency on the largest neighborhood size of a node,
which has plagued previous research on this problem.
2. Related Work
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the previous computational complexity and algo-
rithmic results for the problem of -MSNE computation (additive approximation scheme as most
commonly defined in game theory) in general. A full account of all specific sub-classes of GMhGs
such as normal-form games and (standard) graphical games is beyond the scope of this paper, just
as is the discussion on (a) other types of approximations such as the less common relative approx-
imation; (b) other popular equilibrium-solution concepts such as pure-strategy Nash equilibria and
correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974, 1987); and (c) other quality guarantees of solutions, including
exact MSNE and “well-supported” approximate MSNE.
The complexity status of normal-form games is well-understood today, thanks to a series of
seminal works (Daskalakis et al., 2009a; Daskalakis, Goldberg, & Papadimitriou, 2009b) that cul-
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minated in the PPAD-completeness of 2-player multi-action normal-form games, also known as
bimatrix games (Chen, Deng, & Teng, 2009). Once the complexity of exact MSNE computation
was established, the spotlight naturally fell on approximate MSNE, especially in succinctly rep-
resentable games such as graphical games. Chen et al. (2009) showed that bimatrix games do not
admit an FPTAS unless PPAD ⊆ P. This result opened up computing a PTAS.
There has been a series of results based on constant-factor approximations. The current best
PTAS is a 0.3393-approximation for bimatrix games (Tsaknakis & Spirakis, 2008), which can be
extended to the cases of three and four-player games with the approximation guarantees of 0.6022
and 0.7153, respectively. Note that sub-exponential algorithms for computing -MSNE in games
with a constant number of players have been known prior to all of these results (Lipton et al., 2003).
As a result, it is unlikely that the case of constant number of players will be PPAD-complete. Along
that line, Rubinstein (2015) considered the hardness of computing -MSNE in n-player succinctly
representable games such as general graphical games and graphical polymatrix games. He showed
that there exists a constant  such that finding an -MSNE in a 2-action graphical polymatrix game
with a bipartite structure and having a maximum degree of 3 is PPAD-complete. Chen et al. (2009)
showed the hardness of bimatrix games for a polynomially small , and Rubinstein (2015) showed
the hardness (in this case, PPAD-completeness) of n-player polymatrix games for a constant .
On a positive note, Deligkas et al. (2014) presented an algorithm for computing a (0.5 + δ)-
MSNE of an n-player polymatrix game. Their algorithm runs in time polynomial in the input size
and 1δ . Very recently, Barman et al. (2015) gave a quasi-polynomial time randomized algorithm
for computing an -MSNE in tree-structured polymatrix games. They assumed that the payoffs are
normalized so that the local payoff of any player i from any other player j lies in [0, 1/di], where di
is the degree of i. This guarantees, in a strong way, that the total payoff of any player is in [0, 1]. In
comparison, we do not make the assumption of local payoffs lying in [0, 1/di]. Also, our algorithm
is a deterministic FPTAS when m is bounded by a constant.
Closely related to our work, Ortiz (2014) gave a framework for sparsely discretizing probability
spaces in order to compute -MSNE in tree-structured GMhGs. The time complexity of the resulting
algorithm depends on (k )
k when m is bounded by a constant. Ortiz’s result is a significant step
forward compared to Kearns et al. (2001)’s algorithm in the foundational paper on graphical games.
In the latter work, the time complexity depends on (2
k
 )
k when m is bounded by a constant. Both of
these algorithms are exponential in the representation size of succinctly representable games such
as graphical polymatrix games. Compared to these works, our algorithm eliminates the exponential
dependency on k. Furthermore, compared to Ortiz’s work, we discretize both probability and payoff
spaces in order to achieve an FPTAS. This joint discretization technique is novel for this large class
of games and has a great potential for other types of games.
HARDNESS OF RELAXING KEY RESTRICTIONS.
We use two restrictions: (1) Our focus is on GMhGs (e.g., graphical polymatrix games) with tree
structure, and (2) our FPTAS for -MSNE computation hinges on the assumption that the number
of actions is bounded by a constant. We next discuss what happens if we relax either of these two
restrictions.
Tree-structured polymatrix games with unrestricted number of actions: A bimatrix game is basi-
cally a tree-structured polymatrix game with two players. Chen et al. (2009) showed that there exists
no FPTAS for bimatrix games with an unrestricted number of actions unless all problems in PPAD
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are polynomial-time solvable. In this paper, we bound the number of actions by a constant. We
should also note the main motivation behind graphical games, as originally introduced by Kearns
et al. (2001): compact/succinct representations where the representation sizes do not depend expo-
nentially in n, but are instead exponential in k and linear in n. As Kearns et al. (2001) stated, if
k  n, we obtain exponential gains in representation size. Thus, it is n and k the parameters of
main interest in standard graphical games; the parameter m is of secondary interest. Indeed, even
Kearns et al. (2001) concentrate on the case of m = 2.
Graphical (not necessarily tree-structured) polymatrix games with bounded number of actions:
Rubinstein (2015) showed that for  = 10−8 and m = 104, computing an -MSNE for an n-
player game is PPAD-hard. This hardness proof involves the construction of graphical (non-tree)
polymatrix games. Therefore, the result carries over to n-player graphical polymatrix games. This
lower bound result shows that graph structures that are more complex than trees are intractable
(under standard assumptions) even for constant m and small but constant .
3. Preliminaries, Background, and Notation
Denote by a ≡ (a1, a2, . . . , an) an n-dimensional vector and by a−i ≡ (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an)
the same vector without the i-th component. Similarly, for every set S ⊂ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n}, denote
by aS ≡ (ai : i ∈ S) the (sub-)vector formed from a using exactly the components of S. Sc ≡
[n] − S denotes the complement of S, and a ≡ (aS , aSc) ≡ (ai, a−i) for every i. If A1, . . . , An
are sets, denote by A ≡ ×i∈[n]Ai, A−i ≡ ×j∈[n]−{i}Aj and AS ≡ ×j∈SAj . To simplify the
presentation, whenever we have a difference of a set S with a singleton set {i}, we often abuse
notation and denote by S − i ≡ S − {i}.
3.1 GMhG Representation
Definition 1. A graphical multi-hypermatrix game (GMhG) is defined by a set V of n players and
the followings for each player i ∈ V :
• a set of actions or pure strategies Ai;
• a set Ci ⊂ 2V of local cliques or local hyperedges such that if C ∈ Ci then i ∈ C, and two
additional sets defined based on Ci:
– i’s neighborhood Ni ≡ ∪C∈CiC (the set of players, including i, that affect i’s payoff)
and
– Ni ≡ {j ∈ V | i ∈ Nj , j 6= i} (the set of players, not including i, affected by i);
• a set {M ′i,C : AC → R | C ∈ Ci} of local-clique payoff matrices; and
• the local and global payoff matrices M ′i : ANi → R and Mi : A → R of i defined as
M ′i(aNi) ≡
∑
C∈CiM
′
i,C(aC) and Mi(a) ≡M ′i(aNi), respectively.
We denote by κi ≡ |Ci| and κ ≡ maxi κi the number of hyperedges of player i and the maxi-
mum number of hyperedges over all players, respectively. Similarly, we denote κ′i ≡ maxC∈Ci |C|
and κ′ ≡ maxi κ′i the size of the biggest hyperedge of player i and the size of the biggest hyperedge
over all players, respectively. Also, for consistency with the graphical games literature, we denote
4
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Figure 1: The primal graph of an example GMhG. The endpoints of each edge belong to some
common hyperedge. The sets of local hyperedges of players 1 to 5 are: C1 = {{1, 2}},
C2 = {{2, 5}}, C3 = {{3, 5}}, C4 = {{1, 4}, {4, 5}}, and C5 = {{1, 5}, {5, 2, 3}}. The
neighborhood of 5 is N5 = {1, 2, 3, 5} and the set of players affected by 5 is N5 =
{2, 3, 4}. The local payoff of 5 is the sum of payoffs from the hyperedges {1, 5} and
{5, 2, 3}. For player 5, κ5 = 2 and κ′5 = 3. For the whole graph, κ = 2 and κ′ = 3.
by ki ≡ |Ni| and k ≡ maxi ki the size of the neighborhood of the primal graph induced by the local
hyperedges of i and the maximum neighborhood size over all players, respectively.
Fig. 1 illustrates some of the above terminology. The GMhG shown there (without the actual
payoff matrices) is not a graphical game, because in a graphical game each Ci must be singleton (i.e.,
only one local hyperedge for each node i, which corresponds toNi). This GMhG is not a polymatrix
game either, because not all local hyperedges consist of only 2 nodes. Furthermore, the GMhG is
not a hypergraphical game (Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008), because the local hyperedges are
not symmetric (player 1’s local hyperedge has 2 in it, but 2’s local hyperedge does not have 1).
The representation sizes of GMhGs, polymatrix games, and graphical games are O(nκmκ
′
),
O(nkm2), and O(nmk), respectively.
Normalizing the Payoff Scale. The dominant mode of approximation in game theory is additive
approximation (Lipton et al., 2003; Daskalakis et al., 2007; Deligkas et al., 2014; Barman et al.,
2015). For  to be truly meaningful as a global additive approximation parameter, the payoffs of
all players must be brought to the same scale. The convention in the literature (see, e.g., Deligkas
et al., 2014) is to assume that (1) each player’s local payoffs are spread between 0 and 1, with
the local payoff being exactly 0 for some joint action and exactly 1 for another; and (2) the local-
clique payoffs (i.e., entries in the payoff matrices) are between 0 and 1. Here, we relax the second
assumption; that is, we can handle matrix entries that are negative or larger than 1. Indeed, because
of the additive nature of the local payoffs in GMhGs, the “[0, 1] assumption” on those payoffs may
require that some of the local-clique payoffs contain values < 0 or > 1. This is a key aspect of
payoff scaling, and in turn the approximation problem, that often does not get proper attention. We
have a much milder assumption that the maximum spread of local-clique payoffs (or matrix entries)
of each player is bounded by a constant. We allow this constant to be different for different players.
Note that the equilibrium conditions are invariant to affine transformations. In the case of graph-
ical games with local payoff matrices represented in tabular/matrix/normal-form, it is convention to
assume that the maximum and minimum local payoff values of each player are 0 and 1, respectively.
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This assumption is without loss of generality, because for any general graphical game, we can find
the minimum and maximum local payoff of each player efficiently and thereby make these 0 and 1,
respectively through affine transformations.
While doing this for GMhGs in general is intractable in the worst case, it is computationally
efficient for GMhGs whose local hypergraphs have bounded hypertree-widths. For instance, the
payoffs of a graphical polymatrix game can be normalized in polynomial time to achieve the first
assumption above. To do that, we define the following terms.
ui = max
ai
∑
j∈Ni
max
aj
M ′i,j(ai, aj)
li = min
ai
∑
j∈Ni
min
aj
M ′i,j(ai, aj)
It is evident from the last expression that we can efficiently compute each of those values for each
i via dynamic programming (DP) in time |Ai|(|Ni| + |Ai|) = O(mk + m2), and compute all the
values for all i in time 2
∑
i |Ai|(|Ni|+ |Ai|) = O(m|E|+m2).
Despite such exceptions, in general, we do not have much of a choice but to assume that the pay-
offs of all players are in the same scale, so that using a global  is meaningful. For any local-clique
payoff hypermatrix M ′i,C , we define the following notation on the maximum payoff, minimum pay-
off, and the largest spread of payoffs in that hypermatrix, respectively.
ui,C ≡ max
aC∈AC
M ′i,C(aC)
li,C ≡ min
aC∈AC
M ′i,C(aC)
Ri,C ≡ ui,C − li,C
Example. The following example shows that restricting the values of the local-clique hyperma-
trices to [0, di] while keeping the maximum and minimum values of the local payoff functions of
each player i to be 1 and 0, respectively, loses generality (e.g., some local-clique payoffs may be
negative).The reason is for some games there is no affine transformation that would satisfy both
of these conditions while maintaining exactly the same equilibrium conditions. Let b, c > 0, and
0 < γ < 13 .
M ′1,2 =
[
1 + 2b 1 + 2b− γ
−2c+ γ −2c
]
M ′1,3 =M
′
1,4 =
[ −b −b− γ
c+ γ c
]
u1,2 =1 + 2b, u1,3 = u1,4 = c+ γ
l1,2 =− 2c, l1,3 = l1,4 = −b
R1,2 =1 + 2b+ 2c,R1,3 = R1,4 = b+ c+ γ
6
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M ′1(a1, a2, a3, a4) =

1, if a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 1,
1− γ, if a1 = 1 and exactly one of a2, a3, or a4 = 2,
1− 2γ, if a1 = 1 and exactly two of a2, a3, or a4 = 2,
1− 3γ, if a1 = 1 and a2 = a3 = a4 = 2,
3γ, if a1 = 2 and a2 = a3 = a4 = 1,
2γ, if a1 = 2 and exactly two of a2, a3, or a4 = 1,
γ, if a1 = 2 and exactly one of a2, a3, or a4 = 1,
0, if a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 2,
4. Discretization Scheme: Simple Version
In contrast with earlier discretization schemes (Kearns et al., 2001), we allow different discretization
sizes for different players. Also, in contrast with recent schemes (Ortiz, 2014), we discretize both
the probability space (Definition 2) and the payoff space (Definition 3).
Definition 2. (Individually-uniform mixed-strategy discretization scheme) Let I = [0, 1] be the
uncountable set of the possible values of the probability pi(ai) of each action ai of each player
i. Discretize I by a finite grid defined by the set I˜i = {0, τi, 2τi, . . . , (si − 1)τi, 1} with interval
τi = 1/si for some integer si > 0. Thus the mixed-strategy-discretization size is |I˜i| = si + 1.
We only consider mixed strategies qi such that qi(ai) ∈ I˜i for all ai, and
∑
ai
qi(ai) = 1. The
induced mixed-strategy discretized space of joint mixed strategies is I˜ ≡ ×i∈V I˜ |Ai|i , subject to the
individual normalization constraints.
Definition 3. (Individually-uniform expected-payoff discretization scheme) Let C ′i ≡ C ′i(C′i) ≡
∪C∈C′iC. Define the following two terms.
l¯i ≡ minC′i⊂Ci,C′i 6=∅
min
aC′
i
∑
C∈C′i
M ′i,C(aC) ≥ minC′i⊂Ci,C′i 6=∅
∑
C∈C′i
li,C ≥ minC′i⊂Ci,C′i 6=∅
|C′i|li ≥ min (κili, li)
(The last inequality above considers the cases of negative and non-negative li.)
u¯i ≡ maxC′i⊂Ci,C′i 6=∅
max
aC′
i
∑
C∈C′i
M ′i,C(aC) ≤ maxC′i⊂Ci,C′i 6=∅
∑
C∈C′i
ui,C ≤ maxC′i⊂Ci,C′i 6=∅
|C′i|ui ≤ κiui
Let Ii =
[
l¯i, u¯i
]
denote an interval containing every possible expected payoff values that each player
i can receive from each local-clique payoff matrixM ′i,C(pC), where pC ∈ I˜C (i.e., pC is in the grid).
Discretize Ii by a finite grid defined by the set I˜ ′i = {l¯i, l¯i + τ ′i , l¯i + 2τ ′i , . . . , l¯i + (s′i − 1)τ ′i , u¯i}
with interval τ ′i = R¯i/s
′
i for some integer s
′
i > 0, where R¯i ≡ u¯i − l¯i ≤ max(κiRi, κiui − li).
Thus the expected-payoff-discretization size is |I˜ ′i| = s′i + 1. Then, for any B ⊂ C ∈ Ci, we would
only consider an expected-payoff M˜ ′i,C(aB, qC−B) in the discretized grid that is closest to the exact
local-clique expected payoffM ′i,C(aB, qC−B). More formally, M˜
′
i,C(aB, qC−B) = arg minr∈I˜′i |r−
M ′i,C(aB, qC−B)| ≡ Proj
(
M ′i,C(aB, qC−B)
)
. The induced expected-payoff discretized space over
all local-cliques of all players is I˜ ′ ≡ ×i∈V
(
I˜ ′i
)κi
.
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Chan and Ortiz (2015) use a similar idea in the setting of interdependent defense (IDD) games,
where each of n sites has a binary pure-strategy set, and a specific instance of the general setting
in which the attacker has n + 1 pure strategies. The reason why the attacker has n + 1 pure strate-
gies is because, in the particular instance of IDD games that Chan and Ortiz (2015) consider, the
attacker can attack at most one site at a time, simultaneously. In contrast, the potential multiplicity
of actions of all players poses one of the main challenges in our case, particularly because of the
non-tabular/non-normal-form representation of the general GMhGs, which is exponential in the size
of the largest hyper-edge over all players neighborhood hyper-graphs.
5. A GMhG-Induced CSP: Simple Version
Consider the following CSP induced by a GMhG:
• Variables: for all i and ai, a variable pi,ai corresponding to the mixed-strategy/probability that
player i plays pure strategy ai and, for all C ∈ Ci, a variable Si,C,ai corresponding to some
partial sum of the expected payoff of player i based on an ordering of the local hyperedge
elements of Ci. Formally, if Pi ≡
⋃
ai
{pi,ai} and Si,C ≡
⋃
ai
{Si,C,ai}, then the set of all
variables is
⋃
i
(Pi⋃C∈Ci Si,C).
• Domains: the domain of each variable pi(ai) is I˜i, while that of each partial-sum variable
Si,C,ai is I˜
′
i.
• Constraints: for each i:
1. Best-response and partial-sum expected local-clique payoff: We first compute a hyper-
tree decomposition of the local hypergraph induced by hyperedges Ci. We then order
the set of local-cliques Ci of each player i such that Ci ≡ {C1i , C2i , . . . , Cκii }. The su-
perscript denotes the corresponding order of the local-cliques of player i. We make sure
that the order is consistent with the hypertree decomposition of the local hypergraph, in
the standard (non-serial) DP-sense used in constraint and probabilistic graphical mod-
els (Dechter, 2003a; Koller & Friedman, 2009). For any ai:
(a)
∑
a′i
pi,a′iSi,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ Si,Cκii ,ai −
2
3;
(b) Si,C1i ,ai = M˜i,C1i (ai, pC1i −i), and for l = 2, . . . , κi,
Si,Cli ,ai
= M˜i,Cli
(ai, pCli−i) + Si,Cl−1i ,ai .
We call (a) the best-response constraint and (b) the partial-sum expected local-clique
payoff constraint.
2. Normalization:
∑
ai
pi,ai = 1.
The number of variables of the CSP is O (nmκ). The size of each domain I˜i is O (s), where
s ≡ maxi si. The size of each domain I˜ ′i is O (s′), where s′ ≡ maxi s′i. The computation of each
M˜i,Cli
(ai, pCli−i) in 1(b) above, which takes time O(s
κ′−1), dominates the running time to build
the constraint set. The total number of constraints is O (nmκ). The maximum number of variables
in any constraint is O(mκ′). Given a hyper-tree decomposition, the amount of time to build the
constraint set using a tabular representation is O(nmκsmκ
′
(s′)m), which is the representation
size of the GMhG-induced CSP.
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5.1 Correctness of the GMhG-Induced CSP
We use the following Lemma of Ortiz (2014). Note that our results do not follow directly from
this Lemma, since we also discretize the payoff space. Furthermore, for tree-structured polymatrix
games, Ortiz (2014)’s running time depends on (k )
k when m is bounded by a constant, whereas
ours is polynomial in the maximum neighborhood size k.
Lemma 1. (Sparse MSNE Representation Theorem) For any GMhG and any  such that
0 <  ≤ 2 min
i∈V
∑
C∈Ci Ri,C (|C| − 1)
maxC′∈Ci |C ′| − 1
,
a (uniform) discretization with
si =
⌈
2 |Ai| maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C (|C| − 1)

⌉
for each player i is sufficient to guarantee that for every MSNE of the game, its closest (in `∞
distance) joint mixed strategy in the induced discretized space is also an -MSNE.
We next present our sparse-representation theorem, where we discretize the partial sums of
expected local-clique payoffs.
Theorem 1. (Sparse Joint MSNE and Expected-Payoff Representation Theorem) Consider any
GMhG and any ,
0 <  ≤ 2 min
i∈V
∑
C∈Ci Ri,C (|C| − 1)
maxC′∈Ci |C ′| − 1
.
Setting, for all players i, the pair (τi, τ ′i) defining the joint (individually-uniform) mixed-strategy
and expected-payoff discretization of player i such that
τi =

6 |Ai| maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C (|C| − 1)
and
τ ′i =

3κi
,
so that the discretization sizes
si =
⌈
6 |Ai| maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C (|C| − 1)

⌉
and
s′i =
⌈
3 R¯i κi

⌉
for each mixed-strategy probability and expected payoff value, respectively, is sufficient to guarantee
that for every MSNE of the game, its closest (in `∞ distance) joint mixed strategy in the induced
discretized space is a solution of the GMhG-induced CSP, and that any solution to the GMhG-
induced CSP (in discretized probability and payoff space) is an -MSNE of the game.
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Proof. For the first part of the theorem, let p′ be an MSNE of the GMhG. Let p be the mixed strategy
closest, in `∞, to p′ in the grid induced by the combination of the discretizations that each τi gen-
erates. For all i and ai, set p∗i,ai = pi(ai); and for all i and ai, first set S
∗
i,C1i ,ai
= M˜i,C1i
(ai, p
∗
C1i −i
),
and then recursively for l = 2, . . . , κi, set S∗i,Cli ,ai
= M˜i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i
) + S∗
i,Cl−1i ,ai
. The resulting
assignment satisfies the normalization constraint of the CSP, by the definition of a mixed strategy.
The assignment also satisfies the partial-sum expected local-clique payoffs by construction. Thus,
we are left to prove that the best-response constraint is satisfied. By the setting of τi and Lemma 1,
we have that p is an (/3)-MSNE, and thus also an -MSNE. In addition, for all i and ai, we have
the following sequence of inequalities:∑
a′i
pi(a
′
i)
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(a
′
i, pC−i) ≥
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(ai, pC−i)−

3
.
∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
κi∑
l=1
M ′
i,Cli
(a′i, p
∗
Cli−i) ≥
κi∑
l=1
M ′
i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i)−

3
. (1)
By the definition of M˜i,C , for all i and C ∈ Ci, we have that for all ai and l = 1, . . . , κi,
M˜i,Cli
(a′i, p
∗
Cli−i)−
τ ′i
2
≤M ′
i,Cli
(a′i, p
∗
Cli−i) ≤ M˜i,Cli (a
′
i, p
∗
Cli−i) +
τ ′i
2
.
Applying the last inequality to (1) and by unraveling the construction of the CSP assignment, we
have ∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
κi∑
l=1
(
M˜i,Cli
(a′i, p
∗
Cli−i) +
τ ′i
2
)
≥
κi∑
l=1
(
M˜i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i)−
τ ′i
2
)
− 
3
and ∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
− κi τ ′i −

3
.
Rearranging the terms, and plugging in κi τ ′i =
1
3 we get∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
− 23 .
Hence, the assignment (p∗, S∗) also satisfies the best-response constraints (1(a) of CSP) and is
a solution to the GMhG-induced CSP.
Now, for the second part of the theorem, suppose (p∗, S∗) is a solution of the GMhG-induced
CSP. Then, by the combination of the best-response and partial-sum expected local-clique payoff
constraints, we have that, for all i and ai,∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
− 2
3
 ,
S∗i,C1i ,ai = M˜i,C1i (ai, p
∗
C
|Ci|
i −i
) ,
10
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S∗
i,Cli ,ai
= M˜i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i) + S
∗
i,Cl−1i −i,ai
.
This in turn implies that for all i and ai, we can obtain the following sequence of inequalities:∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
κi∑
l=1
M˜i,Cli
(a′i, p
∗
Cli−i) ≥
κi∑
l=1
M˜i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i)−
2
3

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
∑
C∈Ci
M˜i,C(a
′
i, p
∗
C−i) ≥
∑
C∈Ci
M˜i,C(ai, p
∗
C−i)−
2
3

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
∑
C∈Ci
(
M ′i,C(a
′
i, p
∗
C−i) +
τ ′i
2
)
≥
∑
C∈Ci
(
M ′i,C(ai, p
∗
C−i)−
τ ′i
2
)
− 2
3

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(a
′
i, p
∗
C−i) ≥
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(ai, p
∗
C−i)− κi τ ′i −
2
3

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(a
′
i, p
∗
C−i) ≥
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(ai, p
∗
C−i)−
1
3
− 2
3

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
∑
C∈CiM
′
i,C(a
′
i, p
∗
C−i) ≥
∑
C∈CiM
′
i,C(ai, p
∗
C−i)− 
Hence, the corresponding joint mixed-strategy p∗ is an -MSNE of the GMhG.
Claim 1. Within the context of Theorem 1, we have
si =O
(
mκ′ maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C

)
= O
(
mκ′R

)
,
s′i =O
(
R¯i κi

)
= O
(
R′ κ

)
,
where R ≡ maxj∈V
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C and R
′ ≡ maxj∈V R¯j . If all the ranges Rj,C’s are bounded by a
constant, then
si =O
(
mκ′ κ

)
and
s′i =O
(
κ2

)
.
Proof. First, when all the ranges Rj,C’s are bounded by a constant, we have R = O(κ). Further-
more, R¯j = u¯j− l¯j ≤ κjuj−min(κjlj , lj). When lj < 0, R¯j ≤ κj(uj−lj) and hence R¯j = O(κj).
For the other case of lj ≥ 0, R¯j ≤ κjuj − lj ≤ κjuj . Since uj − lj is bounded by a constant and
lj ≥ 0, uj must also be bounded by a constant and hence R¯j = O(κj). Therefore, R′ = O(κ).
Since both R and R′ are O(κ), we obtain the bounds on si and s′i.
Note that if R′ is bounded by a constant, then li = ω(−1/κi).
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6. CSP-Based Computational Results
The CSP formulation in the previous section leads us to the following computational results based
on well-known algorithms for solving CSPs (Russell & Norvig, 2003, Ch. 5), and the application of
equally well-known computational results for them (Dechter, 2003a; Gottlob, Greco, & Scarcello,
2014; Gottlob, Greco, Leone, & Scarcello, 2016).
Theorem 2. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a number  > 0 and an n-player GMhG
with maximum local-hyperedge-set size κ and maximum number of actions m, and whose corre-
sponding CSP has a hypergraph with hypertree-width w, computes an -MSNE of the GMhG in
time [n (mκκ′/)mκ
′
]O(w).
For GMhGs with bounded hypertree widthw, the following corollary establishes our main CSP-
based result.
Corollary 1. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a GMhG with bounded w, outputs an
-MSNE in polynomial time in the size of the input and 1/, for any  > 0; hence, the algorithm is
an FPTAS. If, instead, we have w = O(polylog(n)), then the algorithm is a quasi-PTAS.
Theorem 2 also implies that we can compute an -MSNE of a tree-structured polymatrix game
in O(n (mk/)2m). Note that the running time is polynomial in the maximum neighborhood size k.
The following results are in term of the primal-graph representation of the GMhG-induced CSP.
Theorem 3. There exists an algorithm that, given as input a number  > 0 and an n-player GMhG
with maximum number of actions m, primal-graph treewidth w′ of the corresponding CSP, maxi-
mum local-hyperedge-set size κ, and maximum local-hyperedge size κ′, computes an -MSNE of the
game in time 2O(w
′)n log(n) + n[(mκκ′/)m]O(w′).
Corollary 2. There exists an FPTAS for computing an approximate MSNE in n-player GMhGs with
correspondingm, κ, and κ′ all bounded by constants, independent of n, and primal-graph treewidth
w′ = O(log(n)).
Corollary 3. There exists an algorithm that, given as input an n-player polymatrix GG with a tree
graph, maximum neighborhood size k, and maximum number of actions m, computes an -MSNE
of the polymatrix GG in time 2O(m)n log(n) + n (mk/)O(m). If m is bounded by a constant, then
the algorithm is an FPTAS. If, instead, m = O(polylog(n)), then the algorithm is a quasi-PTAS.
7. DP for -MSNE Computation
We present a DP algorithm in the context of the special, but still important class of tree-structured
polymatrix games. This is for simplicity and clarity, and as we later discuss, is without loss of
generality. We first designate an arbitrary node as the root of the tree and define the notion of
parents and children nodes as follows. For any node/player i, we denote by pa(i) the single parent
of any non-root node in the tree and by Ch(i) the children of node i in the root-designated-induced
directed tree. If i is the root, then pa(i) is undefined. If i is a leaf, then Ch(i) = ∅.
The two-pass algorithm is similar in spirit to TreeNash (Kearns et al., 2001), except that (1) here
the messages are {−∞, 0}, instead of bits {0, 1}; and (2) more distinctly, our algorithm implicitly
passes messages about the partial-sum of expected payoffs across the siblings.
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Figure 2: DP on a 5-node star polymatrix game. Solid lines represent edges, broken lines show
the final round of message passing. The endpoints of every edge is playing a matching
pennies game between them. The visualization of T1→0, for example, plots p1(a1 = 0)
on x-axis and p0(a0 = 0) on y-axis. Dark grid points denote OK (i.e., T1→0 = 0) and
light grid points not OK. The Ri tables are 3-dimensional. Here we only show one slice
of Ri values corresponding to p0 = (0.5, 0.5). The x-axis represents Si(a0 = 0) (partial
sum up to the i-th child when player 0 plays 0) and y-axis Si(a0 = 1). A 0.1-MSNE
computed for this instance is: p0 = p3 = (0.5, 0.5), p1 = (0.75, 0.25), p2 = p4 = (0, 1).
Collection Pass. For each non-root node i, we denote by j = pa(i). We order Ch(i) as
o1, . . . , o|Ch(i)|. We then apply the following DP bottom-up (i.e., from leaves to root). We give
an intuition before giving the formal specification. The message Ti→j(pi, pj) is 0 iff it is “OK” for
i to play pi when i’s parent j plays pj (the notion of OK recursively makes sure that i’s children are
also OK). The message Bi(pi, pj , So|Ch(i)|) is 0 iff i’s best response to j playing pj is pi, given that
i gets a combined payoff of So|Ch(i)| from its children. The message Rol(pi, Sol) can be thought of
as being implicitly passed from i’s child ol to the next (and back to i from the last child o|Ch(i)|).
Rol(pi, Sol) is 0 iff Sol is the maximum payoff that i can get from its first l children when i plays pi
and those children are OK with that. Fig. 2 illustrates the message passing.
Formally, for each arc (j, i) in the designated-root-induced directed tree (i.e., j is the parent of
i), and (pi, pj) a mixed-strategy pair in the induced grid:
Ti→j(pi, pj) = max
So|Ch(i)|
Bi(pi, pj , So|Ch(i)|) +Ro|Ch(i)|(pi, So|Ch(i)|)
Wi→j(pi, pj) = arg maxSo|Ch(i)| Bi(pi, pj , So|Ch(i)|) +Ro|Ch(i)|(pi, So|Ch(i)|)
where Bi(pi, pj , So|Ch(i)|) =
∑
ai
log
1
∑
a′i
pi(a
′
i)
(
M˜i,j(a
′
i, pj) + So|Ch(i)|(a
′
i)
)
≥ M˜i,j(ai, pj) + So|Ch(i)|(ai)− 

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and, for l = 1, . . . , |Ch(i)|,
Vol(Sol , pol , Sol−1) =
∑
ai
log
(
1
[
Sol(ai) = M˜i,ol(ai, pol) + Sol−1(ai)
])
Fol(pi, Sol , pol , Sol−1) =Tol→i(pol , pi) +Rol−1(pi, Sol−1) + Vol(Sol , pol , Sol−1)
Rol(pi, Sol) = max
pol ,Sol−1
Fol(pi, Sol , pol , Sol−1)
Wol(pi, Sol) = arg max
pol ,Sol−1
Fol(pi, Sol , pol , Sol−1) .
Following are the boundary conditions: Ro0 ≡ 0 and So0 ≡ 0, so that Fo1(pi, So1 , po1 , So0) ≡
Fo1(pi, So1 , po1) = To1→i(po1 , pi). If i is the root, then Ti→j(pi, pj) ≡ Ti(pi) and Wi→j(pi, pj) ≡
Wi(pi). If i is a leaf, Ti→j(pi, pj) takes a simpler, non-recursive form.
Assignment Pass. For root i, set p∗i ∈ arg maxpi Ti(pi) and S∗o|Ch(i)| ∈ Wi(p∗i ). Then re-
cursively apply the following assignment process starting at o|Ch(i)|: for l = |Ch(i)|, . . . , 1, set
(p∗ol , S
∗
ol−1) ∈Wol(p∗i , S∗ol).
7.1 The Running Time of the DP Algorithm
A running-time analysis of the DP algorithm presented above yields the following theorem, which
is one of our main algorithmic results of this paper.
Theorem 4. The DP algorithm computes an -MSNE in a graphical polymatrix game with a tree
graph in time n
(
mk

)O(m)
.
Corollary 4. The DP algorithm is an FPTAS to compute an -MSNE in an n-player graphical
polymatrix game with a tree graph and a bounded number of actions m. If m = O(polylog(n)),
then the DP algorithm is a quasi-PTAS.
8. Further Refinement
We describe a more refined alternative to the GMhG-induced CSP that reduces the dependency
on κ. We are also able to restrict the expected payoff grid to [0, 1], even though the local-clique
payoffs of a player may fall outside of [0, 1]. The main idea is to evaluate the expressions involving
the expected local-clique payoffs matrices M˜i,C(ai, pC−i) in a smart way by decomposing the sum
involving the expectation, considering one player mixed-strategy at a time, and projecting to the
discretized payoff space after evaluating each term in the sum. This approach gives us an FPTAS
for tree graphical games (in normal form) and bounded number of actions, for which the best known
approximation result to-date is a quasi-PTAS. We present the main result below.
Theorem 5. There exists a DP algorithm that computes an -MSNE in a tree graphical game in
time n
(
mk

)3m+2
O
((
mk
)2). If m is bounded, then the running time is poly (nmk, 1 ) and the
algorithm is an FPTAS. If m = O(polylog(n)), then this algorithm is a quasi-PTAS.
8.1 Discretization Scheme: Refined Version
Definition 4. Consider the uncountable set I = [0, 1]. For each player i, approximate I by a finite
grid defined by the set I˜ ′i = {0, τ ′i , 2τ ′i , . . . , (s′i − 1)τ ′i , 1} of values separated by the same distance
14
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τ ′i = 1/s
′
i for some integer s
′
i. Thus |I˜ ′i| = s′i + 1. Then, for any value v ∈ I , we now define its
projection v˜ ≡ Proji (v) to I˜ ′i such that |v˜ − v| ≤ τ ′i/2.
8.2 GMhG-Induced CSP: Refined Version
We now present a more complex generalization of the simpler GMhG-induced CSP.
• Variables: for all i, ai, a variable pi,ai corresponding to the mixed-strategy/probability that
player i plays pure strategy ai and, for all C ∈ Ci, a variable Si,C,ai corresponding to some
scale-normalized partial sum of the expected payoff of player i based on an ordering of the
local-clique/hyperedge elements of Ci, and given an ordering ofC−i =
{
o1, o2, . . . , o|C|−1
}
,
a variable Ei,C,aC−[ot] corresponding to some scale-normalized partial conditional expected
payoff of player i; that is, formally, if Pi ≡
⋃
ai
{pi,ai}, Si,C ≡
⋃
ai
{Si,C,ai}, and Ei,C ≡⋃|C|−1
t=1
⋃
aC−[ot]
{Ei,C,aC−[ot]}, then the set of all variables is
⋃
i
(Pi ∪⋃C∈Ci (Si,C ⋃ Ei,C)).
• Domains: the domain of each variable pi(ai) is I˜i, while that of each partial-sum variable
Si,C,ai and each partial-conditional-expectation variable Ei,C,aC−[ot] is I˜
′
i.
• Constraints: for each i,
1. Best-response and partial-sum expected local-clique payoff: Compute a hyper-tree de-
composition of the local hypergraph induced by hyperedges Ci; then order the set of
local-cliques Ci of each player i such that Ci ≡ {C1i , C2i , . . . , Cκii }, where the super-
script denotes the corresponding order of the local-cliques of player i, and the order
is consistent with the hypertree decomposition of the local hypergraph, in the standard
(non-serial) DP-sense used in constraint and probabilistic graphical models (Dechter,
2003b; Koller & Friedman, 2009); and for any ai,
(a) ∑
a′i
pi,a′iSi,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ Si,Cκii ,ai −
2
3
∑
C∈Ci Ri,C

(b) Si,C1i ,ai = Ei,C1i ,ai , and for l = 2, . . . , κi,
Si,Cli ,ai
= Proji
Ri,Cli Ei,Cli ,ai +
(∑l−1
r=1Ri,Cri
)
Si,Cl−1i ,ai∑l
r=1Ri,Cri

(c) for each setC ∈ Ci, order the elements ofC−i such thatC−i =
{
o1, o2, . . . , o|C|−1
}
,
then set Ei,C,aC−[o1] = Proji
(∑
ao1
po1,ao1
(
M ′i,C(ao1 ,aC−[o1])−li,C
Ri,C
))
and for t =
2, . . . , |C| − 1,
Ei,C,aC−[ot] = Proji
∑
aot
pot,aotEi,C,aC−[ot−1]

2. Normalization:
∑
ai
pi,ai = 1
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The number of variables of the CSP is O
(
nκmκ
′
)
, which is larger than the version of the
CSP presented in the main body, but exactly the worst-case representation size of the GMhG. The
normalization of M ′i,C(aC) in 1(c) above takes constant time, assuming we have precomputed li,C
and ui,C , which take O(m|C|), which is the representation size of M ′i,C , for each i and C ∈ Ci, of
course. The total number of constraints is O
(
nκmκ
′
)
, which is also larger than the version of the
CSP presented in the main body, but exactly the worst-case representation size of the GMhG. The
maximum number of variables in any constraint is O(m), which is smaller than the version of the
CSP presented in the main body by a factor of κ′. Given a hyper-tree decomposition, the amount of
time to build the constraint set using a tabular representation is O(nκmκ
′+1 sm(s′)m+1).
In summary, the representation size of the GMhG-induced CSP presented above, using a tabular
representation, is O(nκmκ
′+1 sm(s′)m+1).
Note the key reduction in the dependence on κ′ from the analogous expression given for the
CSP: the parameter κ′ only appears in the exponent of m, as it also does in the representation size
of the GMhG, and not in the exponent of s.
Theorem 6. (Sparse Joint MSNE and Expected-Payoff Representation Theorem: Refined Ver-
sion) Consider any GMhG and any ,
0 <  ≤ 2 min
i∈V
∑
C∈Ci Ri,C (|C| − 1)
maxC′∈Ci |C ′| − 1
.
Setting, for all players i, the pair (τi, τ ′i) such that
τi =

6 |Ai| maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C (|C| − 1)
and
τ ′i =

3
(∑
C∈Ci Ri,C (|C|+ κi − l)
) ,
so that the discretization sizes
si =
⌈
1
τi
⌉
and
s′i =
⌈
1
τ ′i
⌉
respectively, is sufficient to guarantee that for every MSNE of the game, its closest (in `∞ distance)
joint mixed strategy in the induced discretized space is a solution of the refined version of the GMhG-
induced CSP, and that any solution to the refined version of the GMhG-induced CSP (in discretized
space) is an -MSNE of the game.
Proof. Let p′ be an MSNE of the GMhG. Let p be the mixed strategy closest, in `∞, to p′ in the
grid induced by the combination of the discretizations that each τi generates. For all i and ai, set
p∗i,ai = pi(ai). For all i and C ∈ Ci, such that C − i ≡ {o1, o2, . . . , o|C|−1}, first set
E∗i,C,aC−[o1] ≡ Proji
(
M ′i,C(aC−[o1], pi,o1)− li,C
Ri,C
)
.
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Then for t = 2, 3, . . . , |C| − 1, recursively set
E∗i,C,aC−[ot] ≡ Proji
∑
aot
pi,aotE
∗
i,C,aC−[ot−1]
 .
Finally, given Ci ≡
{
C1i , C
2
i , . . . , C
κi
i
}
, for all i and ai, first set
S∗i,C1i ,ai ≡ E
∗
i,C1i ,ai
.
Then for all l = 2, 3, . . . , κi, recursively set
S∗
i,Cli ,ai
≡ Proji
Ri,Cli E∗i,Cli ,ai +
(∑l−1
r=1Ri,Cri
)
S∗
i,Cl−1i ,ai∑l
r=1Ri,Cri
 .
The resulting assignment satisfies constraints 1(b), 1(c), and 2 of the CSP by construction. We next
show that constraint 1(a) is also satisfied. By the setting of τi and Lemma 1, we have that p is an
(/3)-MSNE, and thus also an -MSNE. In addition, for all i and ai, we have the following sequence
of inequalities: ∑
a′i
pi(a
′
i)
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(a
′
i, pC−i) ≥
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(ai, pC−i)−

3
.
∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
κi∑
l=1
M ′
i,Cli
(a′i, p
∗
Cli−i) ≥
κi∑
l=1
M ′
i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i)−

3
.
For all i and C ∈ Ci, by the Principle of Mathematical Induction we can show that for all t =
1, 2, . . . , |C| − 1, we have∣∣∣∣∣E∗i,C,aC−[ot] − M
′
i,C(aC−[ot], p
∗
[ot]
)− li,C
Ri,C
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ t τ ′i2 .
Similarly, we can show that for all i, ai, and t = 1, 2, . . . , κi,∣∣∣∣∣∣S∗i,Cti ,ai −
∑t
l=1M
′
i,Cli
(ai, p
∗
Cli−i
)− li,Cli∑t
l=1Ri,Cli
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑t
l=1Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ t− l)∑t
l=1Ri,Cli
· τ
′
i
2
.
From the last condition, we obtain
M ′i(pN(i)) ≤
(
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
)∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
+ κi∑
l=1
li,Cli
+
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ κi − l)
τ ′i
2
and
M ′i(ai, pN (i)) ≥
(
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
)
S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
+
κi∑
l=1
li,Cli
−
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ κi − l)
τ ′i
2
.
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Combining, we obtain the following sequence of inequalities.(
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
)∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
− κi∑
l=1
li,Cli
+
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ κi − l)
τ ′i
2
≥
(
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
)
S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
−
κi∑
l=1
li,Cli
−
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ κi − l)
τ ′i
2
− 1
3

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
−
∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ κi − l)∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
τ ′i −
1
3
∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli

Substituting for τ ′i , we obtain the following equation.
τ ′i
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
(|C li |+ κi − l) =
1
3

We can rewrite the above equation as follows.
τ ′i
∑
C∈Ci
Ri,C(|C|+ κi − l) = 1
3

This completes the proof that (p∗, S∗, E∗) is a solution to the refined GMhG-induced CSP.
Now, for the second part of the theorem, suppose (p∗, S∗, E∗) is a solution of the refined GMhG-
induced CSP. Then, the following holds for all i and ai.∑
a′i
p∗i,a′iS
∗
i,C
κi
i ,a
′
i
≥ S∗
i,C
κi
i ,ai
− 2
3
∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli

∑
a′i
p∗i,a′i
∑κil=1M ′i,Cli (a′i, p∗Cli−i)− li,Cli∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
+
∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
(|C li | − 1 + κi − l) τ
′
i
2∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
 ≥
∑κil=1M ′i,Cli (ai, p∗Cli−i)− li,Cli∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
−
∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
(|C li | − 1 + κi − l) τ
′
i
2∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli
− 2
3
∑κi
l=1Ri,Cli

M ′i(p
∗
N(i)) ≥M ′i(ai, p∗N i)−
(
κi∑
l=1
Ri,Cli
(|C li | − 1 + κi − l)τ ′i
)
− 2
3

M ′i(p
∗
N(i)) ≥M ′i(ai, p∗N i)−
1
3
− 2
3

M ′i(p
∗
N(i)) ≥M ′i(ai, p∗N i)− 
Hence, the corresponding joint mixed-strategy p∗ is an -MSNE of the GMhG.
Claim 2. Within the context of Theorem 6, we have
si =O
(
mκ′ maxj∈Ni
∑
C∈Cj Rj,C

)
= O
(
mκ′ maxj∈Ni R′j

)
= O
(
mκ′R′

)
and
s′i =O
(
R′i (κ
′
i + κi)

)
,
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where R′i ≡
∑
C∈Ci Ri,C and R
′ ≡ maxj∈V R′j . If all the ranges Rj,C’s are bounded by a constant,
then we have R′ = O(κ) and R′i = O(κi) = O(κ), which implies
si = O
(
mκ′ κ

)
and s′i = O
(
κ (κ′ + κ)

)
.
8.3 Sparse-Discretization-Based DP for Graphical Games in Normal-Form with Tree Graphs
This appendix is analogous to the DP presented in the main body, but deals with normal-form GGs,
instead of polymatrix GGs. We refer the reader to the introduction to the DP framework for general
context and notation. Because we are dealing with standard graphical games in normal form, we can
assume without loss of generality that the local payoff matrices are properly normalized to [0, 1].
Collection Pass. Recursively, for each node i in the induced directed tree, relative to the root,
denote by j = pa(i). Order Ch(i) and denote the resulting node order by o1, . . . , o|Ch(i)|. Apply the
following DP from leaves to root: for each arc (j, i) in the designated-root-induced directed tree,
and (pi, pj) a mixed-strategy pair in the induced grid,
Ti→j(pi, pj) = max
So|Ch(i)|
Bi(pi, pj , Eo|Ch(i)|) +Ro|Ch(i)|(pi, Eo|Ch(i)|) and
Wi→j(pi, pj) = arg max
So|Ch(i)|
Bi(pi, pj , Eo|Ch(i)|) +Ro|Ch(i)|(pi, Eo|Ch(i)|) ,
where Bi(pi, pj , Eo|Ch(i)|) =
∑
ai
log1
∑
a′i,a
′
j
pi(a
′
i)pj(a
′
j)Eo|Ch(i)|(a
′
i, a
′
j) ≥
∑
a′j
pj(a
′
j)Eo|Ch(i)|(ai, a
′
j)− 

and, for l = 1, . . . , |Ch(i)|,
Vol(Eol , pol , Eol−1) =
∑
aNi−[ol]
log1
Eol(aNi−[ol]) = Proji
∑
aol
pol(aol)Eol(aNi−[ol−1])
 ,
Fol(pi, Eol , pol , Eol−1) =Tol→i(pol , pi) +Rol−1(pi, Eol−1) + Vol(Eol , pol , Eol−1) ,
Rol(pi, Eol) = max
pol ,Eol−1
Fol(pi, Eol , pol , Eol−1) , and
Wol(pi, Eol) = arg max
pol ,Eol−1
Fol(pi, Eol , pol , Eol−1) .
Note that we are using the following boundary conditions for simplicity of presentation: Ro0 ≡ 0
and, for all aNi , Eo0(aNi) ≡ Proji (M ′i(aNi)), so that
Fo1(pi, Eo1 , po1 , Eo0) ≡Fo1(pi, Eo1 , po1)
=To1→i(po1 , pi)+∑
aNi−o1
log1
Eo1(aNi−o1) = Proji
∑
ao1
po1(ao1)Eo0(aNi)
 .
If i is the designated root, then, because there is no corresponding parent j, we have Ti→j(pi, pj) ≡
Ti(pi) and Wi→j(pi, pj) ≡Wi(pi).
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Assignment Pass. For the root i, set p∗i ∈ arg maxpi Ti(pi) andE∗o|Ch(i)| ∈Wi(p∗i ), where o|Ch(i)|
is the last node in the order of the root’s children Ch(i). Then recursively apply the following
assignment process starting at o|Ch(i)|: for l = |Ch(i)|, . . . , 1, set (p∗ol , E∗ol−1) ∈Wol(p∗i , E∗ol).
Note that for the case of polymatrix GGs the DP above would be essentially the same as that
presented in in the main body.
8.3.1 RUNNING TIME OF DP ALGORITHM FOR TREE GRAPHICAL GAMES IN NORMAL-FORM
The worst-case running-time for message passing at each node i is
(
mk

)2m
×
|Ch(i)|∑
l=1
O
((
mk

)m (
m|Ch(i)|−l
)2
m2
(
k

)2)
=
(
mk

)3m+2
×
|Ch(i)|−1∑
r=0
O
((
m2
)r)
=
(
mk

)3m+2
O
((
m2
)|Ch(i)| − 1
m2 − 1
)
=
(
mk

)3m+2
O
((
m2
)(ki−2)−1)
=
(
mk

)3m+2
O
(
m2ki−6
)
if i is an internal node, O
(
m2
(
mk

)2m)
if i is a leaf, and
(
mk

)2m+2
O
(
m2ki−4
)
if i is the root,
from which the running-time result of Theorem 5 follows.
9. Concluding Remarks
We have presented tractable algorithms for computing -MSNE in tree-structured GMhGs when the
number of actions is bounded. The implications of our results can best be highlighted by considering
a very simple 101-node star polymatrix game with a constant number of actions. For computing an
-MSNE of this game, the algorithm of Kearns et al. (2001) takes O(((2
k+2k log k
 )
2)k) time (here
k = 100), the algorithm of Ortiz (2014) takes O((k )
k) time, and ours takes O(poly(k )) time and
thereby solves a 15-year-old open problem. We conclude by emphasizing that our DP algorithm is
simple to implement and that simplicity is a strength of this work.
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